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Abstract — In this paper we study the optimal saving problem 
in the framework of possibility theory. The notion of possibilistic 
precautionary saving is introduced as a measure of the way the 
presence of possibilistic risk (represented by a fuzzy number) 
influences a consumer in establishing the level of optimal saving. 
The notion of prudence of an agent in the face of possibilistic risk 
is defined and the equivalence between the prudence condition 
and a positive possibilistic precautionary saving is proved. Some 
relations between possibilistic risk aversion, prudence and 
possibilistic precautionary saving were established. 
 
Keywords — Possibility theory, Precautionary saving, 
Prudence 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE effect of risk on saving was studied for the first time by 
Leland [1], Sandmo [2] and Drèze and Modigliani [3]. 
They showed that if the third derivative of the utility function 
is positive, then the precautionary saving is positive. Kimball 
introduced in [4] the notion of prudence and established its 
relation with optimal saving.  
    This paper aims to approach optimal saving and prudence in 
the context of Zadeh’s possibility theory [5]. The first 
contribution of this paper is a model of optimal saving, similar 
to the one in [4] or [6], p. 95. The notion of possibilistic 
precautionary saving (associated with a weighting function f, a 
fuzzy number A representing the risk and a utility function 
representing the consumer) is introduced and necessary and 
sufficient conditions for its positivity are established. The 
second contribution is the definition of the notion of prudence 
in possibilistic sense and its characterization in terms of 
possibilistic optimal saving. The third contribution refers to 
some relations between the degree of absolute prudence [4], 
possibilistic risk aversion [7] and possibilistic precautionary 
saving. Among others, the possibilistic precautionary premium 
is defined as a possibilistic measure of precautionary motive.  
This notion is analogous to (probabilistic) precautionary 
premium of [4]. 
We will survey the content of the paper. In Section 2 are 
recalled, according to [8], [9], [10] the definition of fuzzy 
numbers and some associated indicators: possibilistic expected 
utility, possibilistic expected value and possibilistic variance. 
The equivalence between the concavity (resp. convexity) of a 
continuous utility function and a possibilistic Jensen-type 
inequality is proved.  
In Section 3 the possibilistic two-period model of 
precautionary saving is studied. The consumer is represented 
by two utility functions u and v and the risk, present in the 
second period, is described by a fuzzy number. The expected 
lifetime utility of the model is defined with the help of the 
notion of possibilistic expected utility. The main introduced 
notion is possibilistic precautionary saving. It measures the 
changes on optimal saving produced by the presence of risk in 
the second period. If this indicator has a positive value then by 
adding the risk the consumer will choose a greater level of 
optimal saving. The main result of the section characterizes the 
positivity of possibilistic precautionary saving by the condition 
0v . One also proves an approximate calculation formula 
of possibilistic precautionary saving.  
In Section 4 the notion of prudence of an agent in the face 
of risk situation is described by a fuzzy number. The definition 
of this notion follows the line of [11], [12], where we find a 
formal presentation of probabilistic prudence. The main 
result of the section is a theorem which characterizes 
possibilistic prudence in terms of the previously studied 
optimal saving model. 
Section 5 begins by recalling the Arrow-Pratt index [13], 
[14], the degree of absolute prudence [4] and posibilistic risk 
premium [7]. A result of the section characterizes the property 
of possibilistic risk premium to be decreasing in wealth by the 
comparison between prudence and absolute risk aversion 
(prudence is larger than absolute risk aversion). Then the 
notion of possibilistic precautionary premium is introduced 
and some of its properties which establish relations between 
prudence, possibilistic risk aversion and possibilistic 
precautionary saving are proved.  
The paper ends with a section of concluding remarks.  
II. POSSIBILISTIC  EXPECTED UTILITY 
Fuzzy numbers are the most studied class of possibility 
distributions [10]. Their indicators – the expected value and 
variance represent the main instrument in the possibilistic 
study of risk phenomena [7], [9].  
In this section we will define the fuzzy numbers and their 
indicators and we will prove a characterization theorem of 
convex (resp. concave) functions by possibilistic Jensen-type 
inequalities.  
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Let X be a non-empty set. A fuzzy subset of X (shortly, 
fuzzy set) is a function A:X[0,1]. A fuzzy set A is normal if 
A(x)=1 for some xX. The support of A is defined by 
supp(A)={xR|A(x)>0}. 
Assume X=R. For [0,1], the -level set 
][A is defined 
by 
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(cl(supp(A)) is the topological closure of supp(A).) 
The fuzzy set A is fuzzy convex if 
][A is a convex subset 
of R for all [0,1]. A fuzzy set A of R is a fuzzy number if it 
is normal, fuzzy convex, continuous and with bounded 
support. If A, B are fuzzy numbers and R then the fuzzy 
numbers A+B and A are defined by 
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A non-negative and monotone increasing function 
f:[0,1]R is a weighting function if it satisfies the normality 
condition  
1
0
1)(  df . 
Let f be a weighting function and u:RR a continuous 
utility function. Assume that A is a fuzzy number whose level 
sets have the form )](),([][ 21 
 aaA  for any [0,1]. 
The possibilistic expected utility E(f,u(A)) is defined by: 
 
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If u is the identity function of R then E(f, u(A)) is the 
possibilistic expected value [9]: 
 
1
0
21 )()]()([
2
1
),(  dfaaAfE  (2) 
If 
2)),(()( AfExxu  for any xR then E(f,u(A)) is 
the possibilistic variance [9]: 
 
1
0
2
1 )),()([(
2
1
),( AfEaAfVar   
 dfAfEa )(])),()(( 22      (3) 
When f()=2, [0,1], E(f,A) and Var(f,A) are the notions 
introduced by Carlsson and Fullér in [8]. 
Proposition 1. [7] Let g, h be two utility functions and a, 
bR. If u=ag+bh then E(f,u(A))=aE(f,g(A))+bE(f,h(A)).  
Lemma 1. [15] Let u:RR be a continuous utility function. 
The following are equivalent: 
a) u is concave; 
b) For any a, bR, )
2
(
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u
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
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Proposition 2. If u is a continuous utility function then the 
following are equivalent: 
(i) u is concave; 
(ii) E(f,u(A))u(E(f,A)) for any fuzzy number A. 
Proof. (i) (ii) Let A be a fuzzy number such that 
)](),([][ 21 
 aaA  for [0,1]. Since u is concave, the 
following inequality holds: 
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Taking into account that f0 and applying Jensen inequality 
it follows: 
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(ii)(i) Let a, bR, a<b. We consider the fuzzy number A 
for which aa )(1  and ba )(2  for any [0,1]. Then 
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By hypothesis, we will have )
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This inequality holds for any a, bR and u is continuous. By 
Lemma 1, it follows that u is concave.        
Corollary 1. If u is a continuous utility function then the 
following are equivalent: 
a) u is convex; 
b) u(E(f,A))E(f,u(A)) for any fuzzy number A.  
 The following result appears implicitly in the proof of 
Proposition 4.4.2 of [7]. 
Proposition 3. If u is a utility function of class 
2C then: 
),()),((
2
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III. A POSSIBILISTIC MODEL OF PRECAUTIONARY SAVING 
In this section we define a notion of precautionary saving in 
the framework of an optimal saving possibilistic model. The 
positivity of precautionary saving shows that the presence of 
risk increases the level of optimal saving. Intuitively this 
points out that the agent is prudent in the face of possibilistic 
risk. The main result of the section characterizes this 
prudence in an intuitive sense by the positivity of the third 
derivative of one of consumer’s utility functions. 
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The probabilistic two-period model of precautionary saving 
from [6], p. 65 is characterized by the following data: 
 u(y) and v(y) are the utility functions of the consumer for 
period 0, resp. 1 
 for period 0 there exists a sure income 0y  and for period 
1 an uncertain income given by a random variable y~  
 x is the level of saving for period 0 
Assume that u, v have the class 
2C and 0u , 0v , 
0u , 0v . The expected lifetime utility of the model 
is: 
))~)1((()()( 0 ysrvMsyusV    (4) 
where r is the rate of interest for saving. 
The consumer’s problem is to choose that value of s for 
which the maximum of V(s) is attained.  
The possibilistic model of optimal saving that we are going 
to build further starts from the same data, except for the fact 
that y~ will be replaced by a fuzzy number. 
We fix a weighting function f and a fuzzy number A whose 
level sets are )](),([][ 21 
 aaA  for [0,1]. 
The (possibilistic) expected lifetime utility W(s) of our 
model will be defined using the notions of possibilistic 
expected utility from the previous section. 
)))1((,()()( 0 AsrvfEsyusW    (5) 
The relation (5) can be written: 
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By derivation, from (6) one obtains: 
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which can be written: 
)))1((,()1()()( 0 AsrvfErsyusW  (8) 
    Deriving it one more time it follows 
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    One considers the following optimization problem: 
)(max sW
s
                                              (10) 
    Proposition 4. (i) W is a strictly concave function. 
(ii) The optimal solution )(Ass   of problem (10) is given 
by 0)(  sW . 
    Proof. (i) By hypothesis, 0u , 0v , thus by (9) it 
follows 0)(  sW for any sR.  
(ii) follows from (i).    
By Proposition 4 (ii) and (8), it follows that the optimal 
solution 
s  is determined by the following equality: 
)))1((,()1()( 0 AsrvfErsyu 
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 (11) 
Let h:RR be a function of class 
2C . If A is a fuzzy 
number then we denote 
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Proposition 5. The optimal solution 
s of problem (10) has 
the approximate value: 
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Proof. Applying the first order Taylor formula one has: 
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By Proposition 3  
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Applying again the first order Taylor formula it follows 
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     Replacing in (13) it follows: 
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      from where one obtains: 
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      From (11), (13), (14) we obtain 
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       From where the following approximate value of 
s  
follows: 
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       We consider now the optimal saving model in which in 
period 1 we don’t have uncertainty any more: the uncertain 
income A is replaced by the sure income E(f,A). The lifetime 
utility of the model is: 
)),()1(()()( 01 AfEsrvsyuxW      (15) 
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        and the optimization problem becomes: 
)()(max 111
 sWsW
s
                              (16) 
                  
In this case one has 
)),()1(()1()()( 01 AfEsrvrsyusW  (17)              
The optimal solution )),((11 AfEss
  of problem (16) is 
given by 0)(1 
sW , which, by (17), is written: 
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The difference 
  1ss will be called possibilistic 
precautionary saving (associated with 0y , r and A). This 
indicator measures the way the presence of the possibilistic 
risk A causes changes in consumer’s decision to establish the 
optimal saving. 
The following proposition is the main result on our optimal 
saving model. The key-element of its proof is the application 
of Proposition 2. 
Proposition 6.  The following assertions are equivalent: 
(i) 0)()( 1 
 AsAs for any fuzzy number A; 
(ii) 0)(  xv for any xR.  
Proof. Let A be a fuzzy number. From (17) and (11) one 
obtains, by denoting )(Ass   : 
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Taking into account the value of )(1
 sW computed above 
one obtains: 
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The previous inequality holds for any fuzzy number A, thus, 
by Corollary 1, the following equivalences follow: 
  )()( 1 AsAs
   for any fuzzy number A 
 v is convex 
 0)(  xv for any xR. 
 Condition (i) of Proposition 6 (=the positivity of possibilistic 
precautionary saving) expresses the fact that the presence of 
risk leads to the increase of optimal saving, and condition (ii) 
is the well-known property of prudence introduced by 
Kimball in [4]. Since condition (ii) is present both in 
Kimball’s result and in Proposition 6, we conclude that the 
positivity of possibilistic precautionary saving is equivalent 
with the positivity of probabilistic precautionary saving.  
Example 1. We consider the possibilistic optimal saving 
model with the following utility functions:  
yeyvyu  )()( for yR.  
 We remark that 
yeyvyu  )()( , 
yeyvyu  )()( for any yR.  
Let A be a fuzzy number and f a weighting function. Then 
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By Proposition 5, the optimal solution of problem (10) will 
have the approximate value: 
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 The approximate value of 
s  can be written: 
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If we replace A with the fuzzy point E(f,A) it follows: 
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since 0)),(,( AfEfVar . In this case we obtain an 
approximate value of the optimal solution of problem (10): 
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IV. POSSIBILISTIC PRUDENCE  
In this section we will define the meaning that an agent is 
prudent in the face of risk modeled by a fuzzy number. This 
definition is inspired by the concept of prudence in 
possibilistic sense as it has been defined in [12], [11]. Using 
the results from the previous section we will find an equivalent 
formulation of possibilistic prudence in terms of  
precautionary saving. 
Consider an agent with the utility function u of class 
2C  
with 0u , 0u and f a weighting function. If X is a 
random variable then M(X) is its expected value and M(u(X)) 
is the expected utility associated with u and X.  
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The probabilistic utility premium w(x, X, u) associated with 
the real number x, the random variable X and u was introduced 
by Friedman and Savage in [16]: 
))(()(),,( XxuMxuuXxw     (19) 
By [17], the probabilistic utility premium w(x, X, u) 
measures the degree of pain associated with facing the risk X, 
where pain is measured by the loss in the expected utility from 
adding the risk X to wealth x. 
Similarly, we will define the possibilistic utility premium 
w(x, A, u) associated with  xR, the fuzzy number A and the 
utility function u by 
))(,()(),,( XxufExuuAxw    (20) 
Assume that the level sets of the fuzzy number A are 
)](),([][ 21 
 aaA  for any [0,1]. Then (20) is written: 
 
1
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1 ))((
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)(),,( axuxuuAxw  
 dfaxu )())](( 2                 (21) 
We recall from [11], [12] what means that the agent is 
probabilistically prudent.  
Let x be the initial wealth, k a positive constant and X a 
random variable with M(X)=0. We denote 
 )())(()(),,,( xuXxuMkxuuXkxS  
))(( XkxuM                               (22) 
One notices that ),,(),,,( uXkxwuXkxS  - 
),,( uXxw  
),,,( uXkxS is called in [17] the prudence utility premium 
and it is interpreted as measuring the increase in pain of 
facing the risk X in the presence of a sure loss k>0. 
By [11], [12], we say that the agent u is probabilistically 
prudent if 0),,,( uXkxS for any triple (x,k,X) as above. 
The above discussion is the starting point in defining the 
possibilistic prudence.  
If x is the initial wealth, k a positive constant and A a fuzzy 
number with E(f,A)=0 then we denote 
)())(,()(),,,( xuAxufEkxuuAkxS  - 
))(,( AkxufE                     (23) 
 
),,,( uAkxS will be called the possibilistic prudence 
utility premium. It has a similar interpretation with the  
probabilistic prudence utility premium ),,,( uXkxS , but we 
have the possibilistic risk A instead of probabilistic risk X. 
One sees immediately that 
),,(),,(),,,( uAxwuAkxwuAkxS    (24) 
Definition 1. The agent u is possibilistically prudent if  
0),,,( uAkxS for any triple (x,k,A) with the above 
significance. 
Remark 1. According to (24), the agent is possibilistically 
prudent iff the possibilistic utility premium w(x,A,u) is 
decreasing in x. 
Proposition 7.  Assume that the utility function u has the 
class 
3C and 0u , 0u . Then the following are 
equivalent; 
(i)The agent u is possibilistically prudent; 
(ii) 0)(  xu for any xR.  
Proof. Deriving (21) w.r.t. x we obtain 
 
1
0
1 ))(([
2
1
)(),,( axuxuuAxw  
 dfaxu )())](( 2  
))(,()( AxufExu   
From the previous inequality and taking into account 
Remark 1 and Corollary 1 the equivalence of the following 
assertions follows: 
the agent u is possibilistically prudent 
 0),,(  uAxw for all x and A 
 ))(,()( AxufExu   for all x and A 
 ))(,()),(( AxufEAxfEu   for all x and A 
u is convex 
 0u                                             
We go back now to the possibilistic precautionary saving 
model from Section 3 (u(y) and v(y) are the utility functions of 
the consumer for period 0, resp. 1).  
Theorem 1. Under the conditions of Section 3 the following 
assertions are equivalent: 
(a) 0)()( 1 
 AsAs for any fuzzy number A 
(b) 0)(  xv for any xR 
( c) The agent v is possibilistically prudent. 
Proof. (a)(b) By Proposition 6. 
(b)(c ) By Proposition 7.         
Remark 2. The above theorem provides a more intuitive 
meaning to the notion of possibilistic prudence formally 
introduced by Definition 1. Indeed, by the equivalence (a) 
(c) it follows that the agent v is possibilistically prudent iff in 
the presence of risk he chooses a higher level of optimal 
saving.  
Remark 3. In the optimal saving model of Section 3, the 
consumer is represented by the pair of utility functions (u,v). 
As the risk may appear only in period 1 (when the consumer ‘s 
behavior is described by v), the prudence of consumer (u,v) in 
the face of risk coincides with v’s prudence in the face of risk. 
Therefore, under condition (c ) of Theorem 1, we deal with the 
prudence of consumer (u, v). 
V. PRUDENCE AND POSSIBILISTIC RISK AVERSION 
Following the line of Kimball from [4], in this section we 
will investigate the relation between prudence and possibilistic 
risk aversion, issue treated in [7]. Both topics describe two 
attitudes of an agent in the face of risk. By defining 
possibilistic precautionary premium as a case of possibilistic 
International Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Interactive Multimedia, Vol. 2, Nº 4. 
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risk premium [7], the results of the theory of possibilistic risk 
aversion are transferred to possibilistic prudence.  
We consider an agent with the utility function u of class 
2C and 0u , 0u . The Arrow-Pratt index ur is 
defined by [13], [14]: 
            
)(
)(
)(
xu
xu
xru 

 , xR.                          (25) 
If u has the class 
3C then the degree of absolute prudence 
uP was defined by Kimball in [4]: 
)(
)(
)(
xu
xu
xPu 

 , xR.                                    (26) 
One notices that 0uP iff 0u . If ug  then 
gu rP  .  
In the above mentioned papers, ur and uP are indicators for 
analyzing probabilistic risk. 
ur is a measure of risk aversion and uP is a measure of the 
agent’s prudence in the face of risk. By [7], the Arrow-Pratt 
index is an efficient instrument for the study of risk 
represented by fuzzy numbers. 
We fix a weighting function f, a utility function u, a fuzzy 
number A and a real number x. u represents the agent, A the 
risk situation and x is the wealth. We define the possibilistic 
risk premium ),,( uAx as the unique solution of the 
equation: 
)),,(),(())(,( uAxAfExuAxufE  (27) 
In interpretation, the bigger ),,( uAx is, the bigger the 
agent’s risk aversion is.  
 Proposition 8. [7] 
),()),((
2
1
),,( AfVarAfExruAx u    
 Let 21,uu  be the utility functions of two agents such that 
01 u , 02 u , 01 u , 02 u . We denote 11 urr  , 
22 u
rr  .  
Proposition 9. [7] The following assertions are equivalent: 
(a) )()( 21 xrxr  for any xR; 
(b) For any xR and for any fuzzy number A, 
),,(),,( 21 uAxuAx   . 
     The above result is the possibilistic analogue of Pratt 
theorem [14]. It shows how using the Arrow-Pratt index one 
can compare the aversions to possibilistic risk of the two 
agents.  
The following proposition establishes a connection between 
the possibilistic risk aversion and prudence. 
Proposition 10.  The following assertions are equivalent: 
(i) For any fuzzy number A, the possibilistic risk premium 
),,( uAx  is decreasing in wealth: 21 xx  implies  
),,(),,( 12 uAxuAx   ;  
(ii) For all xR, )()( xrxP uu  (prudence is larger than risk 
aversion). 
Proof. Let A be a fuzzy number with 
)](),([][ 21 
 aaA  , [0,1]. From (27) it follows: 
 )),,(),(( uAxAfExu   
 
1
0
21 )())](())(([
2
1
 dfaxuaxu  
Deriving and applying again (27) for ug  one obtains: 
 )),,(),(()),,(1( uAxAfExuuAx   
 
1
0
21 )())](())(([
2
1
 dfaxgaxg  
))(,( AxgfE   
)),,(),(( gAxAfExg   
 From these equalities it follows: 
 ),,( uAx
)),,(),((
),,(),(()),,(),((
uAxAfExu
uAxAfExggAxAfExg




 
 By hypothesis, 0u  and g is strictly increasing, thus the 
following assertions are equivalent: 
 ),,( uAx is decreasing in x 
 For all x, 0),,(  uAx  
 For all x,  )),,(),(( gAxAfExg   
)),,(),(( uAxAfExg   
 For all x, ),,(),,( uAxgAx    
By these equivalences and Proposition 9, the following 
assertions are equivalent: 
 For any fuzzy number A, ),,( uAx is decreasing in x 
For any fuzzy number A and xR, 
),,(),,( uAxgAx    
 For any xR, )()( xrxr ug   
Since )()( xrxP gu  , the equivalence of assertions (i) and 
(ii) follows.                                                          
  The (probabilistic) precautionary premium was introduced 
in [4] as a measure of the strength of precautionary saving 
motive. We define now a similar notion in a possibilistic   
context. 
Let v be a utility function of class 
3C with 0v , 
0v and 0v . The possibilistic precautionary premium 
),,( vAx associated with wealth x, a fuzzy number A 
representing the risk and the utility function v is the unique 
solution of the equation: 
)),,(),(())(,( vAxAfExvAxvfE  (28) 
We returned to the model of precautionary saving of Section 
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3, assuming that v has the class 
3C and 0v , 0v , 
0v . By the optimum condition (11) of Section 3 and 
equation (28), it follows: 
  )( 0 syu  
)))1((,()1( AsrvfEr    
)),,)1((),()1(()1( vAsrAfEsrvr     
We consider the case r=0 and u=v. Then  
)),,(),(()( 0 vAsAfEsusyu
    
from where, taking into account that u is injective, it 
follows: 
)),(),,((
2
1
0 AfEvAsys 
           (29) 
Remark 4. The results of Section 4 connect possibilistic 
prudence and possibilistic precautionary saving. The size of a 
consumer’s prudence is evaluated by the level of optimal 
saving 
s : the bigger 
s is, the more prudent the consumer is. 
Relation (29) between 
s and ),,( vAs shows that the 
possibilistic precautionary premium is an indicator of the 
agent’s prudence.  
One notices that ),,(),,( vAxvAx   therefore we 
can apply to ),,( vAx all the results valid for possibilistic 
risk premium. In particular, Propositions 8, 9, 10 lead to 
Proposition 11.  
),()),((
2
1
),,( AfVarAfExPvAx v   
Proposition 12. Let 21,vv be two utility functions of class 
3C  with 01 v , 02 v , 01 v , 02 v , 01 v , 
02 v . The following assertions are equivalent: 
(a) )()(
21
xPxP vv  for any xR 
(b) For any xR and for any fuzzy number A,  
),,(),,( 21 vAxvAx    
Proposition 13. Let v be a utility function of class 
4C  with 
0v , 0v , 0v , 0ivv . The following assertions 
are equivalent: 
(i) For any fuzzy number A, the possibilistic precautionary 
premium ),,( vAx is decreasing in x; 
(ii) 
)(
)(
)(
)(
xv
xv
xv
xv iv




 for any xR.  
The three propositions from above are possibilistic versions 
of theorems of Kimball [4]. Proposition 11 provides an 
approximate calculation formula of possibilistic precautionary 
premium w.r.t. the index of absolute prudence and the 
possibilistic indicators associated with a fuzzy number A. The 
equivalence of conditions (a), (b) of Proposition 12 gives a 
criterion to compare the prudence of the agents represented by 
the utility functions
21,vv . By [12], 
)(
)(
xv
xv iv

 is called the 
degree of temperance of the utility function v. As 
)(
)(
xv
xv


 is 
the degree of absolute prudence of v, the inequality of 
condition (ii) of Proposition 13 expresses the fact that 
temperance is bigger than prudence.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The possibilistic approach of the optimal saving problem is 
founded on the hypothesis that risk situations are represented 
by fuzzy numbers, and consumers are described by their utility 
functions. The formulation of the possibilistic optimal saving 
problem and the definition of possibilistic prudence use the 
notion of possibilistic expected utility from [7]. The study of 
these two topics and their interconnections use the two main 
possibilistic indicators: expected value and variance [7], [9]. 
 This paper contains the following contributions: 
 The characterization of the concavity of continuous utility 
functions by a possibilistic Jensen-type inequality; 
 The definition of the notion of possibilistic precautionary 
saving and the characterization of its prudence (i. e. the 
optimal saving increases in the presence of risk) by the 
condition of positivity of the third derivative of the utility 
function (= the prudence in the sense of Kimball [4]) ; 
 The definition of the notion of possibilistic prudence 
(following the line of [11], [12]) and its characterization by the 
positivity of precautionary saving 
 The relation between possibilistic risk aversion and 
prudence; 
 The definition of possibilistic precautionary premium as 
strength of possibilistic precautionary saving, its 
approximate calculation and its use to compare the degrees of 
absolute prudence of two consumers.  
We mention a few directions to continue the research of this 
paper: 
- the study of a model of optimal saving and prudence in 
case of several risk parameters represented by fuzzy 
numbers; 
- the study of optimal saving and prudence for situations 
with mixed risk parameters: ones represented by 
random variables, and others by fuzzy numbers; 
- the possibilistic analysis of temperance and other 
higher-order risk attitudes of an agent [18].  
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